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Wepropose and study a new calling convention that provably
enforces well-bracketed control flow and local state encap-
sulation on a capability machine. The calling convention is
based on linear capabilities, a type of capabilities that are pre-
vented by the hardware from being duplicated. In addition
to designing and formalising this new calling convention,
we also contribute a new way to formalise and prove that
it effectively enforces well-bracketed control flow and local
state encapsulation, building on the concept of fully abstract
compilation.
1 Introduction
Secure compilers preserve source-language (security-relevant)
properties even when the compiled code interacts with ar-
bitrary target-language components. Generally, properties
that hold in the source language but not in the target lan-
guage, need to be somehow enforced by the compiler. Two
properties that hold in many high-level source languages,
but not in the assembly languages they are compiled to, are
well-bracketed control flow and encapsulation of local state.
Well-bracketed control flow expresses that invoked func-
tions must either return to their callers, invoke other func-
tions themselves or diverge, and generally holds in program-
ming languages that do not offer a primitive form of con-
tinuations. At the assembly level, this is not so obvious, as
invoked functions get direct access to return pointers, that
they are supposed to jump to a single time, at the end of their
execution, but there is no guarantee that untrusted assembly
code respects this intended usage. Particularly, a function
may invoke return pointers from other stack frames than its
own: either frames higher in the call stack or ones that no
longer exist as they have already returned before.
Local state encapsulation is the guarantee that when a
function invokes another function, its local variables will
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not have been modified when the invoked function returns.
At the assembly level, this property is also far from obvi-
ous. The calling function’s local variables are stored on the
stack during the invocation, and functions are not supposed
to touch stack frames other than their own. However, un-
trusted assembly code is free to ignore this requirement and
overwrite the local state of its caller or other stack frames.
To enforce these properties, target language security prim-
itives are needed that can be used to prevent untrusted code
from misbehaving, without imposing too much overhead
on well-behaved code. The virtual-memory based security
primitives on commodity processors do not seem sufficiently
fine-grained to efficiently support this. More suitable secu-
rity primitives are offered by a type of processors known
as capability machines [4, 6]. These processors use tagged
memory to enforce a strict separation between integers and
capabilities: pointers that carry authority. Capabilities come
in different flavours. Memory capabilities are used to read
from and write to memory. Additionally, the CHERI capabil-
ity machine offers sealed code-data pairs of capabilities that
represent an encapsulated closure: a piece of code coupled
with private state that it gains access to upon invocation.1
CheriBSD, an operating system built on CHERI, uses per-
component separate stacks and a central, trusted stack man-
ager component to enforce well-bracketed control flow and
private state encapsulation [6]. To prevent the stack pointer
(or derivatives) from being passed to other components,
CheriBSD uses local capabilities: a type of capabilities that
can be kept in registers but not stored in memory (except
through store-local capabilities like the stack pointer itself).
The literature does not contain many details about the mech-
anism, let alone a formal analysis, but additionally, the mech-
anism does not seem able to support higher-order interfaces
(e.g. C function pointers) in a scalable fashion.
In recent work, we have been looking at an alternative
approach [5]. We also use CHERI’s local capabilities, but
combine them with a more traditional, single, shared stack
that scales better in the presence of higher-order interfaces.
By passing stack and return pointers as local capabilities, we
effectively prevent callees from storing them on the heap.
Using a step-indexed Kripke logical relation, we are able to
1Other capability machines offer other mechanisms that can be used to the
same effect.
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prove correctness of programs that rely on well-bracketed
control flow in a complex way.
While this approach works quite well, this paper inves-
tigates another alternative approach. We aim to make two
improvements, discussed in the next sections: (1) remove
the need to clear the stack on boundary crossings and (2)
explore a new formal statement of well-bracketed control
flow and local state encapsulation.
2 Linear Capabilities, not Local
What we essentially want to achieve in a secure calling
convention is to give an invoked function access to a stack
pointer and a return pointer, but only temporarily: during the
execution of the invoked function. In our original approach,
we make both pointers local, so that the CHERI processor
guarantees, essentially, that they can only be stored in reg-
isters or on the stack. To prevent an invoked function from
transferring the pointers across outside the lifetime of its
stack frame, it then suffices to block only these two commu-
nication channels, rather than the entire memory. In other
words, we need to clear registers and the stack before passing
control to untrusted code, to prevent it from obtaining ac-
cess to stack and return pointers for other stack frames than
its own. The requirement for clearing registers is unprob-
lematic, but clearing the entire stack upon every boundary
crossing is a non-trivial requirement. We speculate that it
can be made efficient with custom hardware extensions2, but
this is not obvious.
An alternative that does not have this requirement, re-
lies on linear capabilities, rather than local ones. Although
details in the literature are scarce, linear capabilities have
already been implemented in the SAFE machine [2]3 and
considered for implementation in CHERI4. The idea is that
all capabilities are marked as either regular or linear. Linear
ones are subject to special hardware-enforced restrictions,
that prevent them from being duplicated. For example, when
linear capabilities are moved to a new location in registers
or memory, they are erased from their old location. A few
special instructions are needed to make this workable, e.g.
a split instruction that splits a memory capability for a re-
gion of memory into disjoint capabilities for two parts of the
region and a splice instruction that does the reverse. This
linearity is a powerful tool: when passing a linear capability
to untrusted code and receiving the same capability back, we
are sure that they cannot have stored a copy of it. Similarly,
when we receive, from untrusted code, a linear capability
that addresses memory that we know is only ever addressed
by linear capabilities, then we are sure that the untrusted
code no longer has access that memory.
2Specifically, we imagine a kind of pre-L0 processor cache that does not
retain values but only remembers that a certain range has been zeroed out.
3Private communication with Catalin Hritçu.
4Private communication with Robert Watson.
As such, linear capabilities can be used as an alternative
to local capabilities to enforce well-bracketed control flow.
We cannot provide full details here for space reasons, but the
idea is essentially the following. By passing stack and return
pointers as linear capabilities, and requiring that invoked
functions hand in their stack pointer upon return, untrusted
code is prevented from holding on to stack and return point-
ers past their intended lifetime, essentially because they can
only ever have one copy and they have to hand it in when
this lifetime ends.
3 Formalising well-bracketed control flow
The second improvement we are making is related to the
properties of well-bracketed control flow and local state en-
capsulation. To establish these properties, our previous work
followed previous work [3] in providing a sound reasoning
technique and using it to prove soundness of challenging
example programs that rely on the properties. In the current
work, we are investigating an alternative way to formalise
the two properties, based on the notion of fully abstract
compilation [1].
We intend to start by formalising the assembly language
for a capability machine with linear capabilities (the target
language). Then, we will introduce the source language: a
variant of this target language that features a primitive stack,
built into the operational semantics, as well as additional
instructions like call. While the target language is a standard
assembly language without even the notion of a stack, the
source language does have a stack, and control flow well-
bracketedness and local state encapsulation follow more
directly from the operational semantics. We will formalise
our calling convention in the definition of a compiler from
the source to the target language. Additionally, we conjec-
ture that this compiler can be proved fully abstract, thus
formally expressing and establishing security of the calling
convention.
Interestingly, the proof of full abstraction for this com-
piler is expected to use a very simple back-translation, that
simply maps every target language instruction to the cor-
responding instruction in the source. This back-translation
works because we construct our source language in such a
way that it has direct counterparts to every target language
value. Specifically, the source language contains a represen-
tation of stack and return pointers as unspecified abstract
values whose behavior corresponds to their target counter-
parts, but in a way that guarantees the intended properties
of well-bracketed control flow and local state encapsulation.
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